
The U.S. and China are building competing international networks around AI infrastructure, supply chains, and governance.
Kazakhstan is the only country belonging to both blocs, showing that the emerging AI divide is not strictly binary.
W.A.I.C.O.โs 29 founding members include 12 African countries, while Pax Silica is concentrated among advanced economies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific.
Artificial intelligence is becoming a major arena for geopolitical competition between the U.S. and China, spanning advanced chips and data centers to technical standards and AI governance.
This visualization maps two emerging camps: the U.S.-led Pax Silica initiative and Chinaโs World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization (W.A.I.C.O.). The visualization is based on data from the U.S. Department of State and Xinhua Net.
Two Competing Visions for the AI Era
Pax Silica is a U.S.-led initiative focused on securing the physical foundations of AI, including semiconductors, computing infrastructure, advanced manufacturing, and critical minerals. Its membership brings together many economies that occupy important positions in the global chip supply chain.
By contrast, W.A.I.C.O. is an intergovernmental organization headquartered in Shanghai. In July 2026, 29 countries signed its founding agreement, with a stated goal of promoting international cooperation and global governance around safe and equitable AI.
The table below shows the countries participating in the two groups:
Country | Group |
|---|---|
๐ฐ๐ฟ Kazakhstan | Both |
๐ฆ๐ท Argentina | Pax Silica |
๐ฆ๐บ Australia | Pax Silica |
๐จ๐ฑ Chile | Pax Silica |
๐จ๐ท Costa Rica | Pax Silica |
๐ธ๐ป El Salvador | Pax Silica |
๐ซ๐ฎ Finland | Pax Silica |
๐ฉ๐ช Germany | Pax Silica |
๐ฌ๐ท Greece | Pax Silica |
๐ฎ๐ณ India | Pax Silica |
๐ฎ๐ฑ Israel | Pax Silica |
๐ฎ๐น Italy | Pax Silica |
๐ฏ๐ต Japan | Pax Silica |
๐ณ๐ฑ Netherlands | Pax Silica |
๐ณ๐ด Norway | Pax Silica |
๐ต๐ฆ Panama | Pax Silica |
๐ต๐ญ Philippines | Pax Silica |
๐ถ๐ฆ Qatar | Pax Silica |
๐ธ๐ฌ Singapore | Pax Silica |
๐ฐ๐ท South Korea | Pax Silica |
๐ธ๐ช Sweden | Pax Silica |
๐ฆ๐ช United Arab Emirates | Pax Silica |
๐ฌ๐ง United Kingdom | Pax Silica |
๐บ๐ธ United States of America | Pax Silica |
๐ฆ๐น Austria | Pax Silica (via EU) |
๐ง๐ช Belgium | Pax Silica (via EU) |
๐ง๐ฌ Bulgaria | Pax Silica (via EU) |
๐ญ๐ท Croatia | Pax Silica (via EU) |
๐จ๐พ Cyprus | Pax Silica (via EU) |
๐จ๐ฟ Czech Republic | Pax Silica (via EU) |
๐ฉ๐ฐ Denmark | Pax Silica (via EU) |
๐ช๐ช Estonia | Pax Silica (observer status only) |
๐ซ๐ท France | Pax Silica (via EU) |
๐ญ๐บ Hungary | Pax Silica (via EU) |
๐ฎ๐ช Ireland | Pax Silica (via EU) |
๐ฑ๐ป Latvia | Pax Silica (via EU) |
๐ฑ๐น Lithuania | Pax Silica (via EU) |
๐ณ๐ฑ Netherlands | Pax Silica (via EU) |
๐ต๐ฑ Poland | Pax Silica (via EU) |
๐ต๐น Portugal | Pax Silica (via EU) |
๐ท๐ด Romania | Pax Silica (via EU) |
๐ธ๐ฐ Slovakia | Pax Silica (via EU) |
๐ช๐ธ Spain | Pax Silica (via EU) |
๐น๐ผ Taiwan | Pax Silica (non-signatory participant) |
๐ฉ๐ฟ Algeria | WAICO |
๐ง๐พ Belarus | WAICO |
๐ง๐ท Brazil | WAICO |
๐ฐ๐ญ Cambodia | WAICO |
๐จ๐ฒ Cameroon | WAICO |
๐จ๐ณ China | WAICO |
๐จ๐ฌ Congo | WAICO |
๐จ๐บ Cuba | WAICO |
๐ช๐น Ethiopia | WAICO |
๐ฎ๐ฉ Indonesia | WAICO |
๐ฎ๐ท Iran | WAICO |
๐ฐ๐ช Kenya | WAICO |
๐ฐ๐ฌ Kyrgyzstan | WAICO |
๐ฑ๐ฆ Laos | WAICO |
๐ฑ๐ธ Lesotho | WAICO |
๐ฒ๐พ Malaysia | WAICO |
๐ฒ๐ฟ Mozambique | WAICO |
๐ฒ๐ฒ Myanmar | WAICO |
๐ณ๐ฎ Nicaragua | WAICO |
๐ด๐ฒ Oman | WAICO |
๐ต๐ฐ Pakistan | WAICO |
๐ท๐บ Russia | WAICO |
๐ธ๐ณ Senegal | WAICO |
๐ท๐ธ Serbia | WAICO |
๐ฟ๐ฆ South Africa | WAICO |
๐น๐ฏ Tajikistan | WAICO |
๐บ๐ฟ Uzbekistan | WAICO |
๐ป๐ช Venezuela | WAICO |
๐ฟ๐ฒ Zambia | WAICO |
The memberships reveal two different geographic strengths. Pax Silica includes the U.S. and major European and Indo-Pacific technology economies, while W.A.I.C.O. extends more deeply into the Global South, including Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa, Pakistan, and numerous African states.
Why Countries Are Choosing Different Sides
The two blocs are not exact equivalents. Pax Silica is principally a supply-chain partnership, while W.A.I.C.O. is a treaty-founded international organization centered on AI cooperation and governance. That difference also helps explain why membership can overlap.
For Washington, access to cutting-edge chips and trusted supply chains is a major source of leverage. The U.S. ecosystem includes semiconductor strengths across countries such as Japan, South Korea, and the Netherlands, while Americaโs broader economic relationship with Beijing remains deeply interconnected through U.S.-China trade.
China, meanwhile, can offer developing economies infrastructure, training, and access to increasingly competitive open-weight AI models. This may be particularly attractive to countries that feel underrepresented in Western-led technology institutions or want to avoid dependence on a single supplier.
The Worldโs AI Swing States
The map also highlights Canada, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, Tรผrkiye, and Vietnam among the major economies still in play. Their choices matter because AI infrastructure is becoming increasingly difficult to separate from foreign policy.
This does not necessarily mean every country must permanently choose Washington or Beijing. Singapore and other globally connected economies have incentives to preserve access to multiple technology ecosystems, particularly as AI adoption varies widely around the world.
The stakes are enormous. One analysis estimates roughly $800 billion in Asia-Pacific data center investment through 2030, meaning todayโs decisions about chips, clouds, energy systems, and technical standards could lock in relationships for decades.
What the AI Cold War Could Mean for the Future
Rather than two isolated digital worlds emerging overnight, the bigger risk is gradual fragmentation. Countries could face different rules governing access to cloud infrastructure, technical standards, and AI models depending on their partnerships.
Yet the map also shows why the Cold War analogy has limits. These blocs are neither mutually exclusive nor military alliances, and many strategically important economies remain outside either camp.
The contest may ultimately be less about which country builds the best AI model and more about which ecosystem becomes indispensable. Washington is betting on control of crucial supply-chain chokepoints and trusted infrastructure, while Beijing is building a broader coalition around access, development, and a larger role for emerging economies in AI governance.




Comments
Log in or sign up to join the conversation.