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I’ve heard many times that we can talk ourselves into a recession by too many doom-and-gloom discussions. We seem to be running that experiment right now, with rising concerns about an economic downturn. But a look at history shows we never have talked ourselves into recession, and the likelihood that we do so in the future is minuscule.

Consumer attitudes influence consumer spending, which is a huge part of the economy. One key lesson I learned early in my forecasting career is that consumer confidence typically follows the economy, not leads it. When unemployment is low, inflation is low, and interest rates are low, consumer attitudes are almost always good. Conversely, high unemployment, high inflation, and high-interest rates make consumers gloomy. That said, attitudes will sometimes be a bit higher than economic fundamentals would suggest, or somewhat lower, and thus they can nudge discretionary consumer spending from the path it would otherwise take. But it’s usually a small nudge, not enough to trigger a recession by itself.

When non-economic factors influence consumer attitudes, we should pay close attention. That was the case in the First Gulf War. Consumer attitudes dropped sharply in 1990 as the U.S. sent troops to Saudi Arabia after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Unemployment had been edging up slowly prior to the war, inflation had been declining and interest rates were stable. Consumer attitudes did drop, but that may have been connected with a sharp rise in oil prices, which pushed inflation up in the subsequent months. Nonetheless, this looks like a good example of consumer attitudes having an independent impact on the economy. But it hardly seems fair to say that “we talked ourselves into recession” when a war started and oil prices jumped.

Looking through our past recessions, I cannot find any good examples of talking ourselves into recession. Let’s roll through the post-World War II downturns.

The very mild recession of 1948-49 preceded the modern consumer surveys, but economic conditions had been fairly good, so attitudes were probably positive. Then credit controls were imposed that limited bank lending to consumers, and as a result sales of consumer durables (such as cars and appliances) dropped sharply. Exports also declined. Attitudes have played little or no role.

July 1953 marked a cyclical peak, followed by a recession through May 1954. Consumer sentiment had actually been rising prior to the recession. Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz attribute the recession to Federal Reserve actions “which produced a drastic tightening of money markets and the closest thing to a money market crisis since 1933.”

Our next recession began in August 1957, which Friedman and Schwartz again attribute to monetary policy. Consumer sentiment had no downward trend, though a jagged pattern of ups and downs.

The 1960 recession followed the nation’s worst strike, the 116-day action by the United Steelworkers of America, which coincided with Federal Reserve tightening. Consumer confidence had been rising after the strike ended in November 1959.

We then enjoyed a very long expansion, ending December 1969 with a mild recession. Consumer attitudes had been declining in the months leading up to the recession, but interest rates had risen even more dramatically, up nearly three percentage points in a 12-month span, as the Fed tried to limit inflation. Growth of the monetary base and the M2 definition of money supply slowed sharply. Attitudes may have been worsened by the inflation and rising interest rates. America’s struggle with the Vietnam war could also have been a factor. In the end, there’s no smoking gun pointing exclusively at consumer attitudes.

The 1973-75 recession was another example of the Fed trying to limit inflation. That came just as the Arab oil embargo pushed energy costs up sharply. Attitudes dropped before the November 1973 peak, but then recovered much of their lost ground. The Federal Reserve pushed the Fed Funds rate up from five percent to ten percent in a year’s time. Economists argue about the relative importance of Fed tightening and the oil price increase, but attitudes by themselves played no role.

The Fed relented and inflation resumed its acceleration. In October 1979, Fed chairman Paul Volcker announced a major change to monetary policy in which the money supply would be limited to control inflation. A few months later short-term interest rates hit a peak of 17.6%, with similar increases in mortgage and corporate bond rates. Once again oil prices jumped, this time due to the Iranian revolution pushing global supply down. The economy dipped into recession just as consumer sentiment hit bottom. A brief expansion began, and then we learned the meaning of “double-dip” as the 1981-1982 recession began. Consumer attitudes had been improving, but the Fed had again tightened.

The 1990 downturn, discussed early, had been preceded by some Fed tightening, but the First Gulf War may have pushed attitudes down enough to trigger the recession.

A long expansion followed, hitting a peak in March 2001. Dot-com stocks had collapsed, and the enormous computer spending in preparation for Y2K was over. Surprisingly, monetary policy had been easing in the six months preceding the start of the recession, but only after 12 months of tightening. Milton Friedman concluded that monetary policy worked with long time lags, and this may well be the case. Consumer attitudes had declined sharply before the downturn. The University of Michigan’s survey of consumer sentiment dropped from 109.2 to 88.4 in the 12 months leading up the cyclical peak, and the Conference Board’s consumer confidence measure fell from 137.7 to 109.9. Some economists attribute the downturn, at least partially, to lingering impacts of the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-99. International factors were certainly at play, as U.S. exports dropped 12%. Some people blame the 9/11 attacks, but chronology of the recession beginning in April 2001 and ending in November 2001 doesn’t fit well with that hypothesis.

The final recession so far is the 2008-09 downturn, certainly not caused by doom and gloom attitudes. The more likely culprit is the over-optimism generally occurring among consumers, homebuyers, financial institutions and government officials. Housing was dramatically overbuilt, lending was hugely too liberal, and public policy inconsistent and counterproductive.

Looking forward, are we talking ourselves into recession? I certainly hear plenty of talk of recession, but I don’t buy that we are simply too gloomy for our own good. If we have a recession beginning in the next year—which economists currently think has 25% probability—the most likely cause will once again be the Federal Reserve.